

"NOLAN AT BALAKLAVA: PART IV *: SOAME JENYNS ET AL.; A HYPOTHESIS"**by Dr. Douglas J. Austin 10 [TWC 24(4) p15 2007]***** Part III of this series appeared in 'The War Correspondent', 24(3), 20-25, 2006.**

With kind permission from Mr Roger Jenyns, this article presents the first transcription of an original 12-page letter from Captain Soame Gambier Jenyns (1826-1873), who commanded B Troop of the 13th Light Dragoons in the Charge of the Light Brigade. It was written before 2 p.m. on 27 October, 1854, to his mother in Hertfordshire, reaching Royston on 15 November of that year. This is a valuable addition to Jenyns's letters from the Crimea to J. Anstruther Thomson [1] and to those held in the Cambridgeshire Record Office.


Balaklava Oct 27th 1854 Dearest Mother,

As I am afraid you will see by the papers before you even get this that we have had another action and alas! for us a most bloody one. I will write here an account of it and thank God for my safety, on the 25th the hills in front of Balaklava (on which were 7 of our guns manned by Turks) were attacked by 15000 men, Cavalry and Infantry, and a great many guns. The action began at 6.30, we were ordered up with Maude's Troop Hs. Artillery to help them and a heavy Cannonade began on both sides we had only 2 troops Hs. Artillery and the Cavalry (about 1400) and 3 regiments of Turks in 3 forts, with the 7 guns. They attacked us in front & right flank. The instant the firing began we lost one trooper (the one next me) and young Goad's horse by cannon shot. Shells, balls and Minies going like fury - poor Maude just before us was blown up into the air by a shell but only lost his arm - The rascally Turks when the Russians came within 600 yards, except one Regt. who stood a little longer & and fired a little, came down the hill & ran for it, *sauve qui peut*, I longed to shoot them. [2] All the forts were immediately occupied by the Russians who took up their positions on the hills. We retired slowly to our Camp ground and lost a good many horses & men by shells on the way. The Turks had so encouraged the enemy that they came with about 2,600 Cavalry in front & 1000 on the right - right across the plain to attack us - the 2,600 at the heavy Brigade, and the 1000 at a regiment of our Highlanders, the only Infantry we had here, but they were met with different sort of Stuff to the Turks. The Cavalry came within about 150 yds. of the Highlanders who gave them a volley, they halted, turned & cut [3] in all directions back over the hills, the remainders were met by our heavy Brigade with such a cheer from them & us in the middle of the plain - they fought hand to hand for a few minutes and then turned (2000 & all) reserve and all, and galloped back in awful confusion, peppered by our Artillery. [4] They looked so foolish. Clouds of Cossacks were hovering in their rear, & our front - we were then on the left and kept back to keep them in check, after the Cavalry had cut.

There was a cessation for about an hour, while some of our Infantry & a few French came to our help. We then all advanced and they deserted 2 forts [5], but assembled in immense force about 3/4 mile off in the furthest valley. Capt. Nolan then brought an order (about which you will see enough in the papers I suspect) to Lord Lucan. I heard it, 'Lord Raglan *orders you to attack the enemy & retake the guns*' which order was sent to Lord Cardigan who merely said 'Very well'. [6] We then advanced to attack 9 guns with 3000 Cavalry, Lancers, Hussars, & Cossacks to defend them, 6 guns on the left, on a hill 3 columns of Infantry on our right with 4 guns all firing shell, grape, and case shot - the 13th & 17th in one line first, and 8th 11th & 4th in another about 400 yds. in our rear. We were ploughed up with shell & shot during a most tryingly long advance at least 1/2 a mile, - we kept capital line - and when within 100 yds. went in with a shout led by Lord Cardigan who was blown by the concussion of a gun at its muzzle on to my horse, it turned me round too, but the shot missed both - The instant we were among them, altho' fearfully reduced [7], they cut helter skelter and we followed them cutting them about till we left the guns about 200 yards in our rear clear with

only the horses left in them. We then were of course attacked in the rear by two fresh Regts. & had to fight our way back as no one was sent to support us. No one within 1/4 a mile - I shot two wheelers in the guns as I came back to stop them & then had (as had all our remnants) to get back as we could (cut to pieces by the guns and Infantry right & left) to the heavy Brigade, my poor horse dying all the way - he just got me back. I rallied about 20 men in the guns again, but the instant they got together at it they went again. *All say such a charge was never heard of, or such murder ordered,* [8] as the Gen Canrobert said who saw it - 'C'est magnifique, c'est grand, mais ce n'est pas la guerre'. [9]

Now must be related the sad sad tale of killed. Poor dear Goad is gone. Oldham and Montgomery too, poor Goad was last seen by a private on foot with his pistol, covered with blood, being surrounded by Cossacks. Oldham was lying on his face on 3 horses at the muzzle of the guns. We had 76 horses killed and 10 wounded, 46 men 3 officers killed or missing; The 17th nearly as bad. The 4th 8th and 11th not quite so cut up and that's all one can say. All our officers either were killed wounded or had their horses shot. Tremayne's horse was killed going up to the battery. Smith was slightly wounded by a lance - Chamberlayne and Jervis both horses killed, and ditto my poor old nag, he carried me back and then I ended his misery.



[Jenyns' North Valley Sketch Text (clockwise from top left) :-

'6 Guns Hrs. Artillery'; 'Videttes'; 'Lancers'; '9 Guns Lancers Cossacks! & Hussars'; 'Guns'; 'Column Infantry'; 'Guns & Inf; 'Column Infantry']

Your prayers dearest Mother must have been answered, for I had 5 shots struck me and my horse, and am only slightly hurt in the knee, by a spent ball, merely a bruise, no cut even but one grape shot went through both my horses shoulders one into his thigh, one into my cloak, but stopped there, and a bit of a shell carried away another bit of my cloak making that article like a sieve when unrolled - really amid all our grief for lost friends my chief thought is thankfulness. The enemy were not attacked any more, and now hold one battery of the Turks and are in immense force behind the hills in our front. We are saddled night and day and were out on the 26th from 4 until 6 p.m. by which time we wanted our breakfast! The Russians tried to take Balaklava that was their object. We ca [sic] camped on the same ground but shifted a little back yesterday - I can see the

enemy as I write this about 2000 Infantry in sight. We only went (what with work parties out &c) 110 into action so our loss is dreadful. The Colonel was on the sick list, so was not there, so I brought the sad skeleton back and command now - However we only did what was ordered, and did it like Englishmen I hope. But there is a fearful responsibility attached to whoever ordered it. They say Lord Raglan gave no such order, that it was Nolan's own order, however poor fellow he was killed first just in front of me by a shell. [10] Every one is outrageous [sic] at the order whose ever it was. I can only swear it was given in most definite terms. Lord Cardigan galloped in to the guns as coolly as if on parade at our head - We do not know our loss or the enemy's yet, but the ground was a horrid sight. 5000 of them got an awful licking 600 prisoners taken & about 400 killed in a sortie yesterday with about 60 killed & wounded on our side [11] - I believe we evacuate Balaklava it being too extended a position for our small mounted force. Sebastopol is to be stormed tomorrow they say. I send a little sketch of the scene of our fight - it is about 1/4 mile from where I drew it to the 9 guns [12] - I got 3 letters from you, & one from Mary & my father & papers yesterday (the papers most acceptable) for which many thanks - There is just a hope that poor Goad is a prisoner, but alas only just a hope. Young Goad was hurt early in the day & was not in the Charge - How to open it to his Mother we don't know - we are not going to write except to Charles this post. [13] I must now stop and get my dinner 2 p.m. as we may be turned out any moment & I may lose it - alas a solitary meal. My two best companions gone! Think G. is all right - The Russian artillery is very good - I have not got the box yet - I do not care about the lozenges - Goodbye and God bless you all.

W. love affec son.

Soame G Jenyns

Greatly daring, I now advance a tentative hypothesis, based on Jenyns' letter and the following five accounts [(1)-(5)]:-

(1) Detailed discussions in the Yahoo Crimean War Group have concluded that, on Raglan's orders, the First and Fourth Divisions of British infantry marched from their camps after 8 a.m. on 25 October. The First Division (under the Duke of Cambridge) paused near the Woronzoff Road and then passed south-west along the Sapouné escarpment before descending via the Col into the North Valley. The Fourth Division (under Cathcart) delayed their start and appear to have gone across country to reach the Col after the First. At or shortly after 10 a.m., the First Division, closely followed by the Fourth, began to descend into the South Valley.

In his book *'Seventy-One Years of a Guardsman's Life'*, Smith, Elder & Co., London, 1916. (pp 185-186), General Sir George Higginson (then a Captain in the Grenadier Guards, First Division) wrote:- *'We had proceeded rather more than halfway when I met Captain Nolan riding up from the lower ground, apparently in search of the adjutant-general. As Captain Nolan's name has acquired great prominence, he being the officer who conveyed to Lord Lucan the ambiguously worded order which led to the annihilation of the Light Cavalry Brigade, I do not cast any reflection on his memory by recording the impression he gave me during the short conversation we held together, that under the stress of some great excitement he had lost self-command.'*

POSTULATE: Higginson (1) met Nolan coming up from the South Valley at or shortly after 10 a.m. Nolan's move requires confirmation and explanation. The same applies to his seemingly urgent wish to locate Brigadier-General James Estcourt the Adjutant-General, who was the senior staff officer at Army Headquarters dealing with administrative business - including personnel and disciplinary affairs.

(2) Colonel Hugh Henry Rose, Queen's Commissioner to French Headquarters in the Crimea, noted in his Journal for 25 October, 1854, that **'Ld Raglan, seemed agitated, took Airey aside and said 'They say that all this happened on account of the order you sent by Nolan to retake the**

guns.' In my endnote (35) in Part III of this series, I observed that '...Raglan spoke of an order sent by Airey to 'retake' what could only have been captured British guns. Most significantly, none of the four written orders to the Cavalry included any instruction to 'take' or 'retake' guns.'

POSTULATE: Rose (2) quoted Raglan as commenting only on a verbal order. The written 3rd Order to the cavalry, which read "Cavalry to advance & take advantage of any opportunity to recover heights - they will be supported by Infantry, who has been ordered -Advance on two fronts - R Airey", was carried down to Lucan by Lieutenant-Colonel Poulett Somerset. Its despatch and receipt have been assessed as 9.30 and 9.50 a.m., but I suggest, however, that they may have taken place at ca. 9.00 and 9.20 a.m., respectively. A verbal order could have been sent later to reinforce the 3rd Order, perhaps in response to the apparent Russian removal of British guns from one or more of the redoubts (attested by Frederick Maxse, Airey, Nicholas Woods and William Howard Russell). Timings of 9.20 and 9.40 a.m. for its despatch and receipt would accommodate Nolan's return from the South Valley at or shortly after 10 a.m. (For reference, the written 4th Order was sent off at 1055 and was delivered by Nolan at 1100.)

(3) Captain Robert Portal (4th Light Dragoons) wrote in his letter to his mother, dated 26 October, 1854 :- 'Well, about an hour afterwards we saw that their Cavalry had formed up in line across a plain, with hills on both sides of it, about a mile from where our Light Cavalry was stationed; a certain Captain Nolan, who is well-known in the army, and who is A.D.C. to General Airey, and who is supposed to be a very dashing Cavalry officer, came up to Lord Lucan and said that the General desired the Light Cavalry would attack to their front at once. Lord Lucan and Lord Cardigan said: 'It seems madness to attack at such a distance without sufficient support of Infantry and Artillery, and we don't know what they may have stationed among the trees on the sides of those hills.' However, Nolan came back shortly afterwards with a written order, which he gave to Lord Lucan, that the Light Cavalry were to attack.'

POSTULATE: Portal (3) stated that Nolan came to Lucan in the North Valley with a verbal order to attack and was refused compliance, in set terms. Nolan returned via the Col (perhaps with a view to informing the Adjutant-General of the non-compliance) and spoke with Higginson. Thereafter, he went to Airey and Raglan on the Sapoune Ridge and returned later (at speed) with the written 4th Order. This delivery of a verbal order is consistent with Jenyns' account (endnote 6, below). I note that Jenyns' account did not describe the receipt of the written 4th Order.

(4) Private John Doyle (1131, 8th Hussars) wrote in his '*A Descriptive Account of the Famous Charge of the Light Brigade at Balaclava with Other Incidents of the Crimean War, And The Indian Mutiny.*', Shottin & Co., Manchester, 1877 : (pp 17, 20-21):- 'We were now ordered to take ground to our left in column of threes, at a gallop. We took up our position on the brow of the hill leading to the valley of Death, where we made the charge from. Captain Nolan was ordered to go to Lord Raglan to ask what was to be done? We were dismounted while he was away. When he returned, he brought the order to Lord Lucan, who was then in command; 'The Light Brigade will advance, and prevent the enemy carrying away our guns!' Captain Nolan was at the time he repeated the order, galloping as fast as he could along our front. Lord Lucan ordered the trumpeter to sound - 'Stand and mount - Gallop!' I heard no other sound, although others said they heard him sound the 'Charge' for the roar of cannon drowned the sound of the trumpet. Captain Nolan, in turning his horse to the left, was met by a round shot from the first battery opened against us, which carried away his right breast and his sword-arm. He never spoke afterwards; but his horse turned to the rear and galloped away, and the next time I saw him he was galloping riderless in the centre of the valley...On the morning of the charge, we were dismounted while waiting for Captain Nolan's return with Lord Raglan's orders, when a sergeant, named Williams, lit his pipe. Colonel Sewell ordered him to be made prisoner and his sword and carbine to be taken from him, and given to a

private to carry on his saddle. The sergeant was not ordered to fall into the rear, so he came with us, and was cut to pieces.'


POSTULATE: Doyle (4), in accord with Portal (3), stated that Nolan (who must have come down from the Sapoune) was told to return to Raglan and ask for clarification - perhaps of the 3rd Order as well as the verbal order - and that Lucan ordered the Light Brigade to advance only after Nolan returned with the written 4th Order. Nolan galloped across the front of the Light Brigade, repeating the verbal order to retake the British guns.

(5) Private Robert Stuart Farquharson (1277, 4th Light Dragoons) wrote in his *'Reminiscences of Crimean Campaigning and Russian Imprisonment', By One of 'The Six Hundred.'*, Thomas Allen, Edinburgh [1883] (pp 29-30):- '...We were then formed into two lines - the 13th Light Dragoons and 17th Lancers forming the first line, and the 4th. Light Dragoons and 11th Hussars the second. The 8th Hussars were behind as a reserve or support. Lord Cardigan was on our right front when Lord Lucan rode up to him and said, 'Well, Cardigan, we have had some fighting this morning; the heavies did splendidly; did they not?' Whilst we waited here Captain Nolan and a French officer were reconnoitring the position of the enemy, who were now in possession of the hills from No. 1 to No. 5 Turkish redoubts. An aide-de-camp from Lord Raglan came up with an order that the Light Brigade of cavalry was to attack the enemy, and recapture, if possible, some guns the latter were carrying off from the Turkish redoubts. Immediately afterwards Captain Nolan came and reported that the ground was clear; that there were none of the enemy in ambush behind the hills to our right. Lord Lucan gave his orders to Lord Cardigan, who ordered the brigade to move off at a walk. This pace we kept at until we were fairly off the hill and into a heavy, ploughed field below, where we broke into a trot, which we continued until getting on to grass, when we got into a gallop, all the time being exposed to a galling fire in front from an eight-gun battery which the enemy had placed in the centre of the valley up which we were advancing to reach the guns we wanted to recapture. Captain Nolan was riding about a hundred yards forward on the right front of the first line when a shell from the enemy burst immediately before him and killed him on the spot. His horse galloped on for some fifty yards further before he fell out of the saddle; and as we tore past we saw him lying on the ground and his faithful animal standing quietly over its master's body amidst all the fire.'

POSTULATE: Farquharson (5) stated that Nolan and an un-named French officer were reconnoitring the North Valley. One of Cardigan's aides-de-camp, rather than Nolan, may have reconnoitred the North Valley. An aide-de-camp came from Raglan with an order for the Light Brigade to attack and retake some British guns, which were being removed. (That aide-de-camp could have been Nolan himself, with the verbal order.) When Nolan arrived with the written 4th Order, he apparently reported (as he would have seen from the Sapoune Ridge) that the enemy were not present south of the Causeway Heights. Lucan then ordered Cardigan forward. Nolan was hit by a shell when well forward on the right front of the first line.

HYPOTHESIS: My current interpretation of these six accounts is that Nolan came down the Sapoune Ridge well before 10 a.m. with a verbal order from Airey to retake British guns. No action ensuing, he was told to get clarification, presumably backed by Raglan's direct authority. Nolan went back up via the Col, possibly with a view to report the non-compliance to the Adjutant-General, and met Higginson on the way. Armed with the written 4th Order, Nolan rode down the face of the Sapoune Ridge at about 11 a.m. and delivered that order to Lucan - apparently without giving proper clarification of the target. As the Light Brigade moved off, Nolan crossed obliquely in front of Cardigan and was hit by a shell fragment. Of course, I shall value comments on and criticism of this hypothesis, particularly those backed with evidence that may prove it correct or - indeed - otherwise.

By happy chance, a silent witness to Nolan's activities at Balaklava is visible to this day. On 25 October, 1875, the 'Balaklava Anniversary Festival', attended by many survivors and their well-wishers, was held at the Alexandra Palace in London. My descriptive Special Publication 32 (Crimean War Research Society), drawn from issues of the 'Daily Telegraph' with engravings from the 'Illustrated London News' for 30 October, 1875, reads, on p 35:- 'At an early hour of the day crowds wended their way by road or rail to Muswell-hill, and when the special programme opened with the 'unveiling of the Balaklava Trophy,' there were plenty of lusty throats to cheer. About the trophy itself not much can be said. A figure of 'Honour' holding a wreath, the flags of the allied nations, and on the plinth the names of deceased officers, made a modest show...'.



If one of those officers was known, or even thought, to have directed the Light Brigade -whether wilfully or in error - to mutilation, death and (glorious?) failure, is it conceivable that the organisers would have marked him out for the ultimate accolade? Yet the officers named on the front of the Trophy were Winter, Charteris, Goad, Lockwood, Oldham, Webb and - most prominently of all - Nolan.

While the issue will remain controversial, I contend that significant evidence exists that Nolan did try to redirect the Light Brigade - at least to the Causeway Heights if not beyond to the South Valley. Further to Major Robin's recent comments on Part II of this series (*The War Correspondent*, 24 (3), 19, 2006), I agree that Kinglake probably was partial on Raglan's behalf. No partiality, however, can disguise Raglan's ultimate responsibility for the verbal order and for the written 4th Order to the cavalry. As for the 'soundness' of the 4th order, Airey made certain that, unlike the first three, it was firmly attributed to Raglan in person, while both Lucan and Cardigan immediately recognised it as a recipe for disaster.

The fact that nothing is mentioned of Nolan's actions in the recent biography of Nolan's friend Captain Morris means precisely nothing, because that book may not record all of Morris' memories of Balaklava. John Harris, in *'The Gallant Six Hundred'* called on accounts from James Wightman (17th Lancers: 1892), George Badger (13th Light Dragoons: 1884 or later) and Henry 'Fitz' Maxse in support of his rejection of any attempt at redirection. Close inspection of the originals, however, shows that Wightman stated that Nolan 'fell back a little way into Cardigan's left rear, somewhat in front of and to the right of Captain Morris, who had taken post in front of his own left squadron...I did not see him cross Cardigan's front...'. I consider that Wightman did not deny that Nolan crossed Cardigan's front, but rather that he did not witness that action. Badger stated 'I was in the front rank of the 13th Dragoons in the Charge, and just on the left of Lord Cardigan...Captain Nolan was right in front of us and was the first to fall...The animal went off a little to the left, or I should have been right against Captain Nolan.' Maxse, positioned well to the right rear of Lord Cardigan, simply denied that Nolan crossed the brigade front.

My concern is only with Nolan's actions before his death, not those of his horse thereafter. Starting from in front of the 17th Lancers (cf. Wightman) and ending in advance and in front of the 13th Light Dragoons (cf. Jenyns and Badger), Nolan must have crossed Cardigan's front - as recorded by Kinglake, further to Cardigan's own Plan and written statement. I have dealt with - and discounted - Maxse's letters in Part II of this series (*'The War Correspondent'* Vol 24 (2), 7-8, 2006) in which I also demonstrated that Kinglake was definitely not the first to mention Nolan's attempt. (Nicholas Woods of the *'Morning Herald'* did that in 1855.) I believe that Nolan's attempt at re-direction cannot be dismissed as 'a story, no more'.

Ockham's Razor is a valuable, but by no means absolute, tool in the assessment of evidence. To quote from R.V. Jones *'Most Secret War'*, Coronet Books, 1980 (p 472), 'But every now and then it will be wrong...By accident you may just have collected a set of facts that can be explained by a simpler hypothesis than what is really occurring; the answer is never to be satisfied but always to search for fresh facts and be prepared to modify your hypothesis in the light of those facts.' I shall continue in that vein in my assessment of further 'Nolan' sources but, for the moment, I must pause this series.

Acknowledgements: I am most grateful to Roger Jenyns, Paul Burns, Tony Lucking, Burnaby Portal and Rod Robinson for their generous provision of documents for this article.

Endnotes:

[1] J. Anstruther Thomson, *'Eighty Year's Reminiscences'*, Longmans, Green and Co., London, New York and Bombay, 1904 ; Volume I; pp 161, 164-167, 167-170, 170-171 and 177-183 (with a Jenyns sketchmap).

[2] Jenyns has doubly-underlined 'rascally'. In fact, the Turks in Redoubt I put up a brave resistance until ca. 7.30 a.m. before retreating. Their behaviour was commended by Lucan and Sir Colin Campbell.

[3] 'cut' = 'ran away'. This was the episode of 'the thin red streak', described in William Howard Russell in *'The Times'* for 14 November, 1854.

[4] 'The Charge of the Heavy Brigade'. An outstanding success, which awaits full investigation.

[5] Presumably Redoubts 4 and 3. The Russians may have abandoned redoubt 4 after disabling its guns. This puts the withdrawal of Russian troops - to form square against cavalry attack - rather earlier than usually given.

[6] Part of this crucial sentence is marked out by asterisks (as shown) in different ink, probably added at a later date. The verbal order included the key word 'retake', which unmistakably designates the target as British guns lost in one or more of the Turkish-manned redoubts. According to Jenyns, Cardigan received it without demur, in huge contrast to his (and Lucan's) well-documented response to the written 4th Order.

[7] That is, the Light Brigade had already taken serious losses.

[8] Part of this sentence is marked out by asterisks (as shown) in different ink, probably added at a later date. Soame Jenyns' letter to Anstruther Thomson (18 November, 1854) stated 'Never was such a mad order given. Nolan is the man to blame.' This is usually taken to mean 'Nolan is to blame', but it can equally well be read as 'Nolan is the man on whom the blame is to be laid' - a very different matter.

[9] This quotation is often ascribed to Bosquet and usually reads 'C'est magnifique, mais ce n'est pas la guerre!', sometimes adding 'C'est de la folie!'. Further to Soame Jenyns' letter, William Howard Russell wrote to a friend (in 1904) that 'it was Canrobert who said 'C'est magnifique, mais ce n'est pas la guerre' and no other.'

[10] This states that Nolan was hit in front of the 13th Light Dragoons while Jenyns was commanding B Troop, to the right of the centre of the first line. It is possible that Jenyns was the 'officer who was one of the nearest of all observers' who provided Kinglake with the diagram showing Nolan's direction as deviating to the south-east from Cardigan. C. R. B. Barrett's *History of the XIII Hussars* (William Blackwood and Sons, Edinburgh and London, 1911) states '...The A and B troops formed one squadron, the A troop being on the extreme right of the line. The D and E troops formed the other, E troop being on the left of the other squadron...The first line consisted of the 13th Light Dragoons on the right and the 17th Lancers on the left. Lord Cardigan placed himself alone in front of the line, a little on the left of the centre...Captain Nolan started to ride with the charge, and it is believed took up a position in the interval between the two squadrons of the 17th. At any rate, it would appear that thence he darted out when he rode obliquely across the front of the advancing line. It was not long before the 13th and 17th came under the guns of the enemy; but before a shot was fired Captain Nolan, as has been mentioned, darted out. He was seen to be wildly waving his sword, and, as it were, endeavouring to make some communication to Lord Cardigan. It is certain that he was pointing in the direction of the Causeway Heights, as if to indicate the true intention of the order which he had conveyed. Whether he would have succeeded in this, if such was his intention, can never be known, for at this moment the first gun from the Russian battery was fired. Nolan was struck by a fragment of a shell which killed him instantly. His sword fell from his hand, but his arm remained erect, and the grip of his knees kept him in the saddle. It chanced that he was mounted on a troop horse of the 13th. The horse with its dead burden wheeled round and passed through the interval between the squadrons. Nolan's body fell in the rear.' Barrett further states that 'In his *Crimean Notes* Colonel Tremayne writes - 'Jenyns went right through the guns, and he told me he shot two wheel horses with his revolver in retiring, feeling sure we should be supported.'...Captain Percy Smith writes - 'You have, of course, seen all the accounts of our charge in the papers, so I will not try to tell you anything more about it, except that 'Jenks' [Jenyns] was worth his weight in gold. He was everywhere, and kept his head as well as if he had been at a common field-day. He was on 'Moses.' The good old horse got shot in four places, and was only just able to get back to the Heavies, behind whom we formed up.'

[11] Later called 'Little Inkerman'. A strong Russian sortie from Sevastopol was beaten back with heavy losses.

[12] This may be an error for '3/4 mile'. The direction of view is to the east. A '3/4 mile' distance would place Soame Jenyns close to Redoubt No. 3 (the Arabtabia) when he drew his fine sketch, complete with dead and wandering horses.

[13] The subsequent letter to Charles Goad, also dated 27 October, 1854, includes:- 'Fancy they sent us (by whose order it has not yet transpired altho I heard Nolan most distinctly say 'Lord Raglan orders you to charge the enemy & take those guns!') to advance 1/2 a mile along a narrow valley with 8 guns on a hill on the left 2 columns of Infantry 9 guns on the right, 9 guns in front, with about 3000 Cavalry to protect them - and no support...Never was such murder ordered.' I note, in particular, the variant wording ('take' rather than 'retake') from his prior letter to his mother, but Jenyns confirmed 'retake' in his letter to Anstruther Thomson of 2 January, 1855.